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W

arfare has, for millenia, been a rich
source of myth and legend, and one of
the main reasons many historians proclaim
Herodotus to be the first to ply their trade is
because, at least, he discounted divine
intervention as the prime explanation for the
ebb and flow of battle. Myths, however,
persist to this day, one of the most popular in
our industrialized culture being a common
belief that technological development
accelerates in wartime. In many cases this
might be true; the First World War, for
example, saw much innovation (this author
hesitates to use the word "progress") in the
development of tanks, aircraft, submarines,
and chemical warfare. In that same war,
however, communications technology did not
keep apace, ironic (especially in the British
Expeditionary Force) given commanders'
insistence that they needed to control their
troops if they were to win battles. Though
much has been said of the impact of machine
guns and quick-firing artillery on the Western
Front, another important source of heavy
casualties was the lack of communication
between the troops in combat and the officers
responsible for providing artillery support or
sending in reserves; 1 as a result men died in
hopeless, unsupported assaults or were
overwhelmed by counterattacks after
capturing their objectives. Communications
were further complicated by the addition of
aircraft to the battlefield, with artillery
observation and photo reconnaissance adding
the war over land to the war on land. 2
Maintaining contact between aircraft and the
troops they were supposed to support would
be an ongoing challenge.
An indication of the state of the art in
1914 could be found in the the most
technologically advanced arm of the British
Expeditionary Force- the artillery. Batteries
could call on wireless aircraft to correct fall of
shot, and in December what had simply been
called the wireless unit became 9 Squadron,
which supplied aircraft and crews to other
units as required, though its pilots did not
lead easy lives, as the transmitter they carried
was so bulky they could not take an observer.
Further, it required so much space in the
small observer's cockpit there was no room
for a receiver, so the pilot could not be entirely

sure his corrections were being monitored.
As he had to carry out the observer's duties as
well as his own, with no one to keep a look-out
for enemy aircraft, it could not have been
popular work. 3 Radio-telephony, the
transmission of human speech by wireless,
had been under development since 1910 but
had not moved beyond basic experimentation
at the end of 1914. 4
On the ground signallers tried to sort out
the communications problems of trench
warfare. In late 1914 and early 1915 the
Canadians in England, still waiting to be sent
to the front, trained the men who would be
responsible for sending and receiving
messages, though within battalions means of
communication were limited and trainees
thus concentrated on flag drill and lamps. 5
Telephones, the most convenient means of
communication then available, were the
responsibility of brigade and division
signalers, who faced an almost impossible
task; when laid on the ground, wire was
easily destroyed by shelling, and the Germans
did not lack for artillery, and stringing it up
on poles increased its endurance only slightly,
so the only recourse left to the short-handed
signallers was to bury it. Finding labour for
such a task when infantry units, who normally
provided work parties, were busy digging
their own trenches and dug-outs was not
easy, and a wire shortage made matters worse.
By July 1916 cable-laying was quick, but
only because an entire battalion worked on
the project at any given time, 6 and soldiers
digging trenches for telephone lines were
subject to shelling and machine gun fire as
they worked through the night. Wireless
telegraphy, which as its name implies did
away with wire, was in the early years of the
war available only in small numbers, reflecting
limited manufacturing resources. 7
The limits of communications technology
were all too evident when on 22 April and in
the days that followed the Canadian
Contingent fought its first major battle at
Second Ypres, when the Germans attempted
a limited offensive using large quantities of
poison gas on the Western Front for the first
time. As often happened, German artillery
quickly cut telephone com-munications and
7
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headquarters knew little of what was
happening. 8 One possible means of dispelling
confusion was the contact patrol, where an
aircraft overflew the front lines to see how the
troops were doing, and one of the first was
during Second Ypres, when the British lost
touch with units at St. Julien and sent aircraft
to locate them. 9 There was, as yet, no way for
troops on the ground to communicate with
the aircraft that sought them out, and the
pilots had to rely on their own eyes to pick out
friendly from enemy soldiers and determine
their condition, so as a technique it left much
room for refinement. It was also dangerous,
requiring pilots to fly low, within range of
small-arms fire. 10
Heavy reliance on the telephone could
thus not be avoided, in spite of its vulnerable
cables. Raiders sometimes took the device
with them into enemy trenches, with a line
crew laying wire through no-man's land. On
one raid in mid-November 1915 a small
Canadian assault fought its way into German
positions, set up a telephone, and sent the
message: "inandallgoingwell." 11 Infantrymen
also used telephones to keep in touch with
supporting artillery. Though the system was
far from perfect, troops often complained that
"Communication between heavies [artillery)
and the trenches is one of our weak points," 12
as enemy shelling cut lines and prevented
them from calling for retaliation.
A possible solution was
soon
forthcoming-laddering- a
technique
consisting in laying parallel cables about
sixty yards apart connected by lateral lines.
To shut down communications, artillery would
have to cut both main cables between crosspieces. The method was not without its
disadvantages, calling for more than double
the length of cable necessary for a single line,
and requiring frequent overhauls, as the great
number of connections made for increased
resistance, which worsened over time. 13 It
was, however, far quicker to prepare than
buried line, and served well for short periods
of time, such as the consolidation phase after
an assault when front-line infantry needed
reliable communications with artillery to help
defend against German counterattacks.

Complicating the development of
battlefield communications (as ifthe presence
of the enemy was not enough) were rules and
regulations designed to ensure security, as in
mid-1915 the Germans were often wellinformed of Allied intentions. "Carefully
planned raids were met by hostile fire exactly
timed and directed. Relieving troops would
be greeted, if not by shells, by shouts of
welcome from the opposing trenches. One
day a Scottish battalion took over its new
front to the strains of its regimental march
played upon a German cornet!" 14 Induction,
by which a signal travelling along a wire also
escaped into the surrounding earth, allowed
the Germans to listen in on front-line
conversations, from as far away as six hundred
yards, through loops of wire set up in noman's land or even within their own positions.
The solution, developed in 1915, was the
Fullerphone, a telegraph which seriously
diminished induction by way of a sophisticated
electronic arrangement. 15 Given its
complexity, however, the device was not
universally available, and in 1916 signs posted
in the front line still proclaimed that anyone
giving away information which the Germans
could pick up on listening sets would be
court-martialled. 16 It had a further
disadvantage, being a Morse system, in
requiring operators trained in that technique.
Thus, in the front line, officers and men were
prohibited from discussing important matters
over the telephone, nor were they allowed to
mention unit identities, names of officers,
locations of ammunition stores, and above
all, timings for reliefs ,I? The same applied to
those developing or working with wireless.
One of the first times the device was used in
the front trenches was in March 1916, by an
officer of the Princess Patricia's Canadian
Light Infantry to control indirect machine
gun fire. His innovative approach led to his
arrest. 18
Such setbacks proved minor, however,
and wireless telegraphy improved through
1915. In September the British attacked
near Loos, and though the battle is best
known for errors in allocating reserves that
eventually led to the replacement of Sir John
French by Sir Douglas Haig as Commanderin-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, it

8
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Canadian Signal Section laying cable during the advance east of Arras, September 1918.
NACPA3080

also saw the use of the Sterling wireless set in
aircraft. Its transmission range of eight to ten
miles was a two-fold improvement over
previous sets, and though the plane trailed a
120-foot copper antenna weighted with a lead
plumb, this does not seem to have affected
performance. 19 The main advantage the new
set offered was to allow the observer to retake
his place, for by early 1916 he, and not a lone
pilot, operated the wireless, though there was
still no room for a receiver. 20 The new
arrangement greatly eased artillery spotting,
and was easy for higher authority to accept as
security was not an important factor in calling
fall of shot; for the information transmitted to
batteries was obsolete before the Germans
could make any use of it.
Among ground units on the Western Front,
wireless had been part of the Canadian
Contingent's communications inventory since
its arrival in France, when it had eight sets,
but it was not until after Second Ypres that

Canadian forward observers on the ground
began to use the devices to call fall of shot. 21
Communications could still break down in
the heat of battle, however. In June 1916 the
Germans attacked and captured Mount Sorrel
after a hurricane bombardment. As usual,
telephone lines were shot out, while wireless
sets in the front lines also became useless as
shrapnel simultaneously destroyed aerials
and prevented repairs. 22 In the counterattack
that followed the Canadians regained the
ridge, and within five minutes of taking the
final objective the 3rd Battalion managed to
get a telephone working and was in contact
with its headquarters. Aircraft could pick out
the new line by coloured flags some of the
troops carried, red for the left brigade and
yellow and black for the right. 23 By combining
modern technology- aircraft-with centuriesold techniques-flag-waving-the British and
Canadians were learning to dissipate some of
the fog of war. By the middle of 1916 the
trend was obvious; there would be no single
9
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development to link the various elements of
the land and air battle. Rather, a wide variety
of technologies and techniques would be
gathered into an ever-more complex
communications network.
The price of keeping such varied channels
open was high. Bombardier William Shaw of
the 151st Siege Battery remembered, "Signals
came to be looked upon as a "suicide club."
Fearful yarns of what happened to "flagwavers" in that and past wars was sufficient
to deter most men from volunteering for such
hazardous duties ... Sometimes the laying of
line at short notice, to a new observation post
at night, over roads, fields, across and along
water-logged trenches, through shelled
villages and at times in view of enemy flares,
was a risky, hazardcfus adventure. The whole
staff of signallers were (sic) often engaged. "24
Bombardier Shaw was referring to British
preparations for the Somme offensive, which
opened on 1 July 1916, relying heavily on the
telephone, so that headquarters were not
easy to move, with runners, lamps, flags, and
pigeons
completing
the
system. 25
Communications, however, were not up to
the task, and on the first day of the battle the
British suffered almost sixty thousand
casualties, a third of them fatal. Gunners
had been unable to help, even though artillery
observation was now the Royal Flying Corps'
chief role. 26 Contact patrols did, however, go
a long way towards keeping higher
headquarters informed of how the troops
were doing; that first day only the Fourth
Army's XIIIth Corps on the far right made any
headway and the aircraft following its progress
found they could fly as low as six hundred
feet even in the midst of a massive land battle,
though pilots might have taken warning from
the number of aircraft being brought down by
ground fire. The first waves of infantry had
mirrors on their backs and the contact aircraft
kept in touch with corps headquarters by
wireless and message drops. 27 How many
mirrors survived the first clash of battle is
unknown.
On 30 August the Canadian Corps began
to take its place on the Somme front and
prepared for the battles to come, which would

last until mid-November. Casualties were
high, and communications between the
headquarters of battalions, brigades, and
divisions difficult to maintain. After the
offensive petered out the 78th Battalion
reported that the Brigade Signals Officer could
well have used an extra thirty or forty men, or
twice the usual establishment. In general
"Every means of communication must be
adopted- telephones, visual with lamps and
flappers, pigeons and runners," 28 though
experiences differed. The 5th Canadian
Mounted Rifles, an infantry battalion in spite
of its name, found that telephones worked
well but visual signalling was obstructed by
smoke and dust (it added that pigeons might
have been useful). 29 The 22nd Battalion found
its telephones working perfectly and dispensed
with visual signalling and pigeons to send
messages to higher headquarters. 30 When the
Corps managed to advance into the German
defences it faced the Herculean task oflaying
and burying cable to the new front line,
though the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles
reported that work parties were up to the task
and at no time was it out of touch with
brigade headquarters. 31 The 22nd Battalion,
attacking at Courcelette on 15 September,
was fortunate in having a wireless and crew
move up right after the battle; aerials were
conspicuous, however, and the set drew enemy
artillery fire. 32 Thus the trend towards
multiplying the variety of means available to
transmit information between higher
headquarters continued.
Keeping in touch with the troops who
were fighting their way into enemy trenches
was a problem that proved almost insoluble.
After an attack on 17 November the 5th
Brigade reported that its battalions had kept
in touch with the front line with visual signals,
but such ease of communication was
uncommon, and even the formation in
question mentioned that it also relied on
runners. 33 Forward of battalion headquarters
the most common means of sending
information was to have men hand-carry
messages through shelling and, occasionally,
machine gun fire. 34 After two months of
fighting on the Somme, commanders simply
assumed that runners would be the only way
to get messages across no-man's land and
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planned accordingly; preparing to assault
Regina Trench on 10 November the 11th
Brigade ordered its battalion commanders to
"send in reports to Battalion headquarters by
runners stating their location and giving
information as regards the situation. "35 Two
years after the war started Canadian
battalions still relied on a means of
communication made famous at Marathon
twenty~four centuries earlier.

office had a direct wireless link to the air
reconnaissance unit so it could fire on German
guns as soon as they were located. 42 While
destroying trenches, gunners tried to get one
observation aircraft for every one of their sixgun batteries. 43 All-in-all the Royal Flying
Corps faced a wide variety of demands as a
communications link between gunners and
the front line at a time when air operations
had become so hazardous the period was
later called "Bloody April."

Contact patrols were supposed to keep
commanders in touch with the situation, but
the system was still experimental. The 78th
Battalion suggested that "Communication to
contact aeroplanes is best maintained by
flares, "36 but such techniques required perfect
timing to ensure the signals were lit while the
aircraft was in position to see them, and such
synchronization was difficult to achieve when
men were fighting for their lives. In the
absence of flares, aircraft flew low in an
attempt to distinguish uniforms, but as we
have seen this was a dangerous manoeuvre. 37
Forward troops sometimes carried white
sheets, though their effectiveness is
unknown. 38 After the offensive the 2nd
Canadian Mounted Rifles suggested that
"Infantry need more instruction in contact
patrol work with aeroplanes," 39 while the
airmen themselves needed more training; in
an attack on Regina Trench on 8 October a
contact patrol reported that the 1st Division
was on its objective, when in fact the formation
had made no progress. 40
In early 1917 Lieutenant~General Sir
Julian Byng, commanding the Canadian
Corps, learned that his formation had been
given the task of capturing Vimy ridge in the
Arras offensive, due to take place in April.
Aircraft were to play an important role,
especially in counter-battery work; for German
shellfire had inflicted heavy casualties on the
Somme, and Lieutenant-Colonel A.G.L.
McNaughton, recently appointed to the newlycreated position of counter-battery staff
officer, relied on the RFC to augment the
information coming from flash spotters and
sound ranging. Aircraft spotted enemy guns
and relayed information over wireless or in
message drops (they also took air
photographs), 41 while the counter-battery

To keep wires off the ground Canadian Signallers
use a German rifle as a telephone pole.
September 1918.
NAC PA 3100

On the ground the Canadian Corps sought
to maintain communications by exploiting
every means available, so runners, flags,
pigeons, and telephones abounded. The power
buzzer, one of the strangest and hence most
intriguing communications developments of
the war, was a recent addition to the
formation's message network, though the
principles guiding its use had been conceived
before the turn of the century. In an angry
letter to the Royal Society's War Committee
soon after the First World War broke out,
Glover Lodge claimed to have experimented
with earth-tapping as a means of wireless
11
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During a brief rest. Canadian Signallers eryoy a light moment resting beside an old German bunker near Lens,
September 1918.
NAC PA 1836

signalling in 1898 and, fruitlessly, suggested
it for use in the Boer War. 44 Certainly, since
the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 it had
been known that electric impulses could travel
through the ground, allowing listening posts
to intercept enemy communications. Early in
the First World War it had occured to some on
both sides that the same principle could be
used to transmit messages without using
cable; after some disappointing experiments,
the British turned to the French, sending
Captain Sir Henry Morgan, MP, to France.

In his report of 25 April 1916, Sir Henry
explained the main problem the British and
French were trying to solve- breakdown in
communications between advanced units and
their supporting artillery batteries, some two
to four thousand yards behind. Telephones,
flares, pigeons, whistles, visual signalling,
wireless, and cyclists had all been tried with
only limited success, but the Captain was
impressed with the experiments of Colonel
Ferrie, the then well-known head of French
military radio-telegraphy. "Indeed I think it

12
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may be said that one series of the[se
experiments] shows the problem to be solved,
under conditions when it is possible to
efficiently earth a long wire at both ends in
the most advanced situation. "45 The device
weighed only six kilograms and was operated
by a single switch to set it for receiving or
transmitting. Powered by accumulators
(recharchable batteries), however, weighing
twelve kilograms, the complete set required
three men to carry and operate. Experiments
had already shown that it was possible to use
a telephone with a fifty-metre gap in the line
ifthe wires were stuck in the ground, but nine
months of British experiments had not been
able to improve the range significantly. The
French device, however, using a fifty-metre
cable as base-line at the transmitting end
and one to two hundred metres at the receiving
end, allowed one-way communication up to
four kilometres. 46
The power buzzer, as the British came to
call the device, was not the kind of
comprehensive solution that could eliminate
alternatives. As Brigadier J.S. Fowler, the
director of army signals, reported in June
1916, it could be jammed by the buzzing
emanating from telephone buzzers and was
easy to pick up on enemy listening sets.
Further, the accumulators needed special
maintenance and care in handling, 47 for they
had a tendency to leak. Finally, as many
veterans were wont to point out in articles
after the war, "its one outstanding
disadvantage was the weight of the batteries
required for the forward station. "48 The French
power buzzer was, however, the best of its
kind, about 250 sets being supplied to the
BEF in October 1916, 49 with some of them
allocated to the Canadian Corps.
For the assault on Vimy Ridge wireless
sets were also available, but only in limited
numbers. DeForest vacuum tubes, with which
many sets were manufactured, were difficult
or impossible to procure as the Americans
placed themselves on a war footing and
purchased all those available, while Western
Electric tubes, the only other source of major
supply, were not adaptable to mass
production. 50 At least the few sets available in
early 191 7 were of a more advanced design;

for in January continuous wave wireless had
made its appearance, relying on a thermionic
valve (or vacuum tube as the Americans called
it) instead of a spark chrystal. The new device
was lighter and more portable, required far
shorter aerials, and had a greater range for
less power expenditure, 51 while the older
version, requiring broad tuning, forced a large
number of stations to operate on the same
narrow band, where they so interfered with
one another as to be ineffective. 52 They were
also conspicuous; the Wilson spark set, for
example, requiring a sixty-yard aerial twelve
feet high for a 4,000-yard range. One of the
few wartime communications developments
to appear after 1915, continuous wave
provided a 6,000-yard range with a thirtyfoot antenna requiring only two or three feet
of aerial, 53 allowing its use far closer to the
front line. First British Army, of which the
Canadian Corps was a part, started teaching
signallers how to use the new sets, which
were reserved for use by field and heavy
artillery units, on 1 March, with 40 to 50
Canadians attending. 54 The Germans had
nothing comparable, not having been able to
develop vacuum technology to the point where
it could be applied to field conditions. 55
On 9 April 35,000 men left tunnels and
trenches and made their way towards the
crest ofVimy Ridge, their faces whipped with
wind and sleet. The 1st Division had little
difficulty reaching its objectives, scientific
gunnery and sophisticated infantry tactics
proving sufficient for the task. General
success was reflected in the realm of
communications as well, as battalions moved
forward and established new headquarters,
which relied mainly on telephones. If
technology had not changed since the
beginning of the war, the way in which it was
applied showed greater sophistication,
especially in cable laddering, which led MajorGeneral Arthur Currie to report that visual
signalling, wireless, and power buzzers were
little used because of the telephone's
reliability. 56
The 2nd and 3rd Divisions were about as
successful as the 1st. The 3rd Division's 8th
Brigade, and probably others, had stored
cable near the front so linesmen following
13
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attacking troops could run two lines from
each battalion headquarters directly to the
final objective. 57 Assuming the assault went
well, each brigade planned to set up an
advanced report centre, with linesmen
running cable up the middle of the brigade's
area so battalions could tap into it. They
could also send runners to the report centre
instead of directing them to make their way
back to headquarters, and the centre in turn
could use wireless, telephone, power buzzer,
pigeons, visual signalling, or its own runners
to keep higher headquarters up-to-date. 58
The 4th Division was an exception to the
day's success and was unable to take its
objectives. It also demonstrated that reliance
on a single trunk line was risky; in the 11th
Brigade's sector, communications failed
completely and Brigadier Victor Odium had
to go forward himself to see what was going
on. 59 There was not always time to ladder the
lines as the battle continued for the next
three days, and as D.E. Macintyre later wrote:
"The trench telephones could be exasperating
things at times, although signallers worked
like heroes to maintain the lines under shell
fire. When a line was hit, both ends would be
flung far apart and a signaller would have to
go and find the break and mend it. He could
follow one end of the wire by letting it run
through his hand as he walked, but the other
end might be yards away, and he would have
to locate and test it, and then make the
repair, often as not in darkness. "60
The main problem, as usual, lay forward
of battalion headquarters, and at Vimy Ridge
runners once again carried the burden of
maintaining communications between
companies and their battalions. 61 Contact
patrols could at least keep track of the advance
and send back information to Corps
Headquarters over wireless or, for longer
reports, message drops. 62 Thus LieutenantGeneral Julian Byng was, ironically, better
informed of the troops' progress than his
division or brigade commanders. Prior to the
attack, infantry on manoeuvres had practiced
sending messages to aircraft, 63 the 28th
Battalion instructing its forward companies
to fire three white Very lights as they captured
each objective so headquarters could follow

their progress, 64 but there are no reports on
whether the flares were ever fired or seen. In
some formations platoons were instructed to
show disks or panels, as well as flares, at
predetermined intervals synchronized with
contact patrols. Thus, with Zero-hour being
the moment the attack began, the 7th Brigade
ordered its troops to signal aircraft at Zero
plus twenty-five, Zero plus sixty, Zero plus
130, and Zero plus 160 minutes. 65 The 1st
Brigade, on a different part of the front,
received orders to set flares at Zero plus fifty
minutes, Zero plus 120, and so on. 66 The 28th
Battalion had a schedule of contact patrols
lasting ten hours. 67
Aside from simply announcing their
positions, advancing battalions also prepared
for two-way communications with contact
patrols, as aircraft could initiate a dialogue
by flashing a code with a white light, or firing
a flare. 68 Forward troops could then identify
themselves by reflecting light off a sheet to
generate a two-letter code in Morse. The 6th
Brigade, for example, was identified by the
letters "CF."
Headquarters identified
themselves with a circular ground sheet, a
half circle for battalions and three-quarter
circle for brigades. Simple letter codes
indicated the unit's status or requested help.
For example, "N" meant the unit was short of
ammunition and "X" that it was held up by
machine guns. Thus "CB" space "0" meant
that the 2nd Brigade had encountered barbed
wire and requested an artillery barrage. 5 9
By 14 April the ridge was in Canadian
hands, on 28 April the Corps attacked at
Arleux, and on 3 May at Fresnoy, the attacks
following a similar pattern. Visual signalling
was limited by smoke or ground mist while
telephones worked as long as the lines
remained intact. Laddering was a great help,
and the cable to one battalion was cut 37
times before communications ceased.
Runners were the system's backbone, on at
least one occasion getting artillery to stop
shelling its own troops. 70 On the whole,
however, communications still left something
to be desired. Power buzzers were of dubious
value, not only because they required almost
perfectly flat ground but due to the weight of
the accumulators that powered them, and

14
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Repairing wire in a communication trench, February 1 918.
NACPA2444

the fact that they tended to leak acid on the
unfortunate soldiers that carried them.
Sources of interference were legion: disused
railway tracks, pipe lines, buried cables or
other metallic objects could interfere with
transmissions, as could telephones. Further,
power buzzers did not eliminate cable entirely,
and the transmission station required a base
line of 150 to 200 yards of wire, rendering it
vulnerable to shell fire. 71 Wireless sets suffered
from a similar problem, their weight
aggravated by the need to set up conspicuous
aerials; and they were powered by
accumulators that needed recharging, a
logistical problem not entirely solved in the
days after Vimy, as the process could only be
done at Corps headquarters, and an already
complicated and strained transportation
network could not always deliver fresh
accumulators to forward stations. 72 Pigeons
were uncertain, though runners were reliable.
Currie suggested that "It would seem advisable
to concentrate on telephonic, visual and
runner communication, wireless being used
as a subsidiary means of communication. "73

The Canadian Corps would never give up its
reliance on a wide variety of signalling
techniques, for it was impossible to predict
which would be most useful in any upcoming
battle.
For example, on 15 August the Canadian
Corps assaulted and captured Hill 70, and
here wireless played an important role, as the
Canadians relied on their gunners to break
up the inevitable German counter-attacks.
Signallers could send back quick corrections
to an artillery exchange, which then passed
them on to the battery concerned by
telephone. 74 The counter-battery guns could
rely on even quicker communications through
a direct wireless link with forward ground
observers, 75 but infantry battalions continued
to rely on the new technology only in
emergencies, rather than integrate it into an
already complex and diverse system. 76
Though Edmund Blunden later wrote that
wireless was apt to squeal nonsense of its
own, 77 some were still intrigued by its
15
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possibilities, even in the mud of
Passchendaele, where the Canadian Corps
joined the battle on 18 October. Four stations
would provide communications between
Forward Observation Officers and their heavy
artillery batteries. Each wireless party
consisted of seven men, who had to carry all
their equipment, on one occasion through
four and a half miles of mud. Teams worked
in 48 hour shifts, under shell fire that forced
them to leave their shelter to repair aerials.
Relief parties brought in rations and water,
fresh batteries, wire for the aerials, vacuum
tubes, and at times new wireless sets, which
quickly wore out under front-line conditions.
One team needed seven sets in 12 days. 78
Among
proponents
of wireless
communication was the "gadget king," A.G.L.
McNaughton who, according to Dr. John S.
Moir, "In the thick of the fighting ... handed
a message to signals personnel located in a
pillbox. The message was to be sent both by
wireless and by carrier pigeon in order to test
the speed of these services. Five minutes
were required to send it by wireless, less time
than it took to get the bird into the air, a
definite augure (sic) for the future." 79 When a
final assault on 10 November brought Third
Ypres, or the Battle of Passchendaele, to an
end, work on wireless continued. Though
there had been problems during the battle
itself, staff officers and commanders came to
consider the wireless as part of the Corps'
general communications system. 80 Again
according to John Moir, the Canadians "were
more hospitable to fresh departures in
signalling than the Imperial troops, "81 and
toyed with the idea of using wireless
extensively to supplement field telephones in
the next offensive. 82 In February, 1918,
equipment became sufficientlly available to
allowdivisons to allocate sets to their brigades,
while battery-charging was decentralized from
corps to division. On 15 June the Canadian
Corps opened a wireless school, for using the
device was complex, involving actual
operation- sending and receiving messagesas well as setting up, maintaining. and
repairing the set; thus only men who were
already trained in Morse keying and ciphers
were accepted as there was too little time to
run a full course. 83

With one campaign over it was time to
prepare for the next, for Passchendaele had
done little more than extend the British salient
arount Ypres and the Germans as yet showed
no signs of cracking. As aircraft came to play
a more prominent role in operations the British
armies
sought
ways
to
improve
communications between airmen and the
infantry or artillery units they supported.
Radio telephony was still not available, while
flares were not entirely satisfactory as the
Germans could use their own to confuse
messages and some colours were simply
difficult to see. 84 By March 1918 the Canadian
Corps was conducting exercises in which
aircraft flew over the trenches daily so brigades
and battalions could improve their proficiency
with Lucas lamps and Popham panels, the
latter being strips of cloth similar to Venetian
blinds which could be used to flash messages
if lighting conditions were appropriate. 85
Aircraft of a different sort were the subject
of several experiments conducted by the
Canadian Corps in May and June 1918.
Forward of brigade headquarters, which could
keep in touch with its flanks and higher
formations with telephone or wireless, the
most widely-used and effective means of
communication remained the runner, who
carried hand- or type-written messages
through enemy and friendly fire in order to
keep commanders appraised of the situation
so they could allocate reserves or artillery
support accordingly. If it were possible to
replace these men with some other means,
they could be retained at the front. Further,
there might be some way to get messages
back much faster than in the hands of a man
who often had to take cover, or might become
wounded or killed. A possible solution was to
use rockets carrying messages as payload,
though the first tests were discouraging, as
they were not sufficiently accurate and it took
so much time to locate them that runners
would have been quicker. 86 By June 1918
there was some improvement, the rocket
proving capable of carrying a message up to
2,200 yards, but even then the impact of
landing, though not affecting the message
itself, made it extremely difficult to open the
nose cone. Officers of the 7th Canadian
Infantry Brigade, who conducted the tests,
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concluded that such rockets would be very
useful in the hands of trained men, 87 but
there was little time to instruct soldiers in
their use, and very few of the devices were
carried on the battlefields of the last Hundred
Days.
On 21 March 1918 the Germans launched
one of the most successful offensives of the
war, against the British Fifth Army, some
distance south of the Canadian Corps'
positions. In April they launched another
series of attacks against Second Army, this
time north of the Canadian front. Given that
their sector was relatively quiet the Canadians
had the leisure to learn from what was
happening elsewhere and train their
battalions accordingly, and in early May the
11th Brigade issued instructions to its
signalling sections to practice independently
and with infantry units. Runners, flags,
telephones, Popham panels, and Lucas lamps
were the
mainstays of Canadian
communications, the panels and lamps used
to send messages to aircraft. 88 The latter
could communicate with artillery batteries
and infantry headquarters with the same
tried-but-true methods, wireless and message
drops respectively. 89 Cooperation between
aircraft and ground units had certainly
become more complex by 1918. The 1915
manual on air I ground cooperation ran to
twenty-seven pages including appendices, 90
while the December 1917 manual on artillery
cooperation alone was seventy-four pages
long. 91 Aircraft still carried transmitters only;
for though years of experiment, mostly in the
United States, had produced radio telephones
that functioned well in demonstrations they
could not be depended on in action, 92
undoubtedly because technicians trained to
repair and maintain them were lacking.
The war was about to enter a different
phase, where headquarters had to move often
in spite of their heavy reliance on the
telephone, pushing signallers almost to the
breaking point to keep messages moving. On
18 July a French counter-offensive near the
Marne brought the last of the German
campaigns to a halt, and on 8 August the
Allies launched a major offensive near Amiens,
the Canadian Corps advancing seven miles
on the first day and thirteen miles by the time

the campaign ended on the 20th. In one of
the first such operations, wireless operators
went to Flanders, north of the actual front
chosen for the offensive, set up their sets, and
maintained a steady flow of dummy traffic to
deceive the Germans as to where the offensive
would begin. 93 The number of sets and men
trained to use them had multiplied
dramatically since Passchendaele; each
infantry or artillery brigade, as well as the
Field Survey Section, and the Canadian
Independent Force of machine guns and
armoured cars, was provided with wireless,
while other sets maintained contact with the
French on the right and the Australians on
the left. 94
The tendency to multiply methods of
communication, so much in evidence at Vimy
Ridge, continued. 95 Telephones, visual
signalling, pigeons, message-carrying rockets,
power buzzers, wireless, runners, and contact
patrols were all available in 1918, 96 though
brigades were limited to visual signalling,
runners, and mounted orderlies. 97 William
Ogilvie, then with the 21st Battery, received
orders to act as mounted liaison. "There
being no telephone wires laid I was to be the
only link between our command party, who
were following close on the heels of the
advancing infantry, and our guns, now being
left far to the rear. "98 A Civil War cavalryman
would not have felt out of place. The first day
of the offensive at Amiens the 5th Battalion
reported that the signals section followed the
advancing infantry closely and established
its first station soon after the attack, then set
up a second station when the advance
continued ninety minutes later. On neither
occasion, however, could they contact brigade
headquarters with lamps. After another few
hours the infantry's success forced them to
set up another station, but again they could
not contact the brigade. 99 A forward observer
moving with the 14th Battalion had different
luck; he saw the unit held up by machine
guns in a wood and reported that "I had
perfect communications and perfect
observation, but was unable to use Artillery
as the Infantry were steadily encircling [the
wood]. "100 The copse was captured in a
flanking assault.
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Maintaining links between the troops and
their headquarters was much more difficult
than in previous battles not only because
battalions moved faster than before but
thanks to new Canadian tactics that called
for the infantry, with tank support, to move
directly to their objectives and bypass strong
points. The 4th Tank Battalion, a British unit
supporting the l st Division's assault, reported
that runners could not keep up with the
advance, but "The Motor Cycle proved to be
very useful in keeping up communication
and might be more fully employed on similar
occasions. " 101 After the battle the lOth
Battalion suggested each battalion
headquarters have a motorcycle for the
communications section, for if roads were
suitable it would provide far better liaison
with brigade headquarters. 102 When the 14th
Battalion reached its objectives, it had to
commandeer two horses to contact the units
on its flanks. 103 Commanders still hoped to
impose some semblance of order on the
battlefield, and the 3rd Brigade's final report
on Amiens included the admonition that, "It
is of the most vital importance during
operations that Brigade be kept informed at
frequent intervals of the progress of the battle,
and the successive points gained by each
Unit during the advance." 104
Thanks to wireless, commanders had
indeed regained some modicum of control
over their formations, but only at higher
levels. In much the same way that contact
patrols had given Corps Headquarters a better
view of the battlefield than was available to
division and brigade commanders, the new
wireless
organization
allowed
communications between brigades, divisions,
and the corps itself. but no lower. Corps sets
had to move often to keep in touch with its
divisions, which were always moving out of
range in the course of the attack, and in the
final days of the Amiens offensive wireless
networks came under pressure as troops
advanced deeper into enemy territory and
divisional headquarters found it impossible
to lay enough cable to set up telephone
systems. Information for counter-battery
work came through wireless, with one station
at Heavy Artillery Headquarters and three

others near the line, but again, as infantry
advanced, communications were sometimes
interrupted as the forward observers had to
pack up their sets and move to a new location.
Thus the main lesson learned at Amiens was
that units needed two sets each, so one could
continue operating while the other moved. A
further lesson concerned training, as the
number of wireless sets operating in a limited
area offered many an opportunity for
unintentional jamming, which could only be
eliminated by ensuring all operators were
thoroughly trained. 105
Amiens was the first of several battles
that slowly moved the Allied front towards the
German border, wearing down armies who
were already short of material and food after
four years of the Royal Navy's blockade. In
these offensives signallers faced a major
challenge just keeping up with the infantry,
but after Amiens often managed to reestablish
telephone links following an attack. To give
just one example, the lOth Brigade reported
after pushing through the Drocourt-Queant
line in early September: "Under very difficult
conditions telephonic communications were
maintained, almost continually, within the
Battalion, throughout the operation. Too
much importance cannot be laid on the
necessity of an abundant supply of wire for
lines. We had no occasion to use pigeons, but
should this contingency have arisen, we would
have been very short. " 106 In fact, at the end of
the war the British Army still operated 150
pigeon lofts on the Western and Italian Fronts,
an indication oftheir perceived importance. 107
At Drocourt-Queant the 3rd Brigade
recounted that visual signalling was too
dangerous as German machine gunners on
the flanks were able to see and fire upon the
signallers handling the lamps, so the
formation had to rely on pigeons and
runners. 108 Will Bird later wrote that "It was
often a joke in the platoons that runners
knew more about what was going on than
anyone else," 109 even in 1918.
In the Canadian Corps' last set-piece
attack of the war, at Valenciennes on land 2
November, there was no time to lay cable and
all messages from brigade to higher
headquarters were sent through wireless
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stations. 11 °Communications between aircraft
and troops on the ground, however, had not
improved; infantry carried a new system for
signalling contact patrols, a white cloth with
a metal disk sewn on the inside flap of the
respirator which troops waved when called
for. The RAF found the devices very useful in
determining the infantry's positions,lll but
all-in-all air-ground communications
techniques in the last Hundred Days were
essentially the same as those of 1917, and
remained so until the Armistice was declared
on 11 November.
The First World War saw the development
and application of aircraft, submarines, and
tanks as effective weapons of industrial
warfare, while tactics underwent drastic
change as fire and movement replaced wave
attacks, and artillery, through scientific
gunnery, proved ever more capable of
supporting infantry battalions as they
struggled to survive in one of the most hostile
environments our species has ever devised.
In the realm of communications, however,
the revolutionary developments of previous
decades, especially the telephone and wireless
telegraph, were only partially applied to
solving the information problems of the
modern battlefield. As a tactical tool the
telegraph had already been supplanted by
the telephone before the war began, and the
latter would dominate communications
organizations on the ground until the war
was long over, wireless proving to be an
administrative problem even after it was so
reduced in size as to allow troops to carry it,
for training a wireless operator in Morse
keying was far more difficult and timeconsuming than teaching a signaller to talk
on the 'phone. In the air wireless, available as
early as 1914, underwent some technical
improvement throughout the war, aimed at
reducing its size. There were thus two
divergent ways in which communications
technology could develop; technically, the
telephone changed little from 1914 to 1918,
but laddered lines, deep buries, and
sophisticated communications networks
steadily improved its usefulness, while
wireless had to undergo technological
change- miniaturization- to fit in to airground and land operations. Both were

attempts to impose order on an essentially
disorderly enterprise, and even in tandem
they were only partially successful.
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